GETTEXT

Susceptible to environment variable driven buffer overflows

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Part "Original Cigital Coding Rule in XML"

Mime-type: text/xml, size: 5438 bytes

Attack Category	• Environment Manipulation
Vulnerability Category	• Buffer Overflow • Unconditional
Software Context	• National Language Support • String Conversion MACROS
Location	• libintl.h
Description	The gettext function attempts to translate a text string into the user's native language by looking up the translation in a message catalog. The msgid argument identifies the message to be translated. By convention, it is the English version of the message, with non-ASCII characters replaced by ASCII approximations. This choice allows the translators to work with message catalogs, called PO files, that contain both the English and the translated versions of each message and can be installed using the msgfmt utility. A message domain is a set of translatable msgid messages. Usually, every software package has it own message domain. The domain name is used to determine the message catalog where the translation is looked up; it must be a non-empty string. For the gettext function, it is specified through a preceding textdomain call. gettext() accesses unvalidated information from the environment. Similar to getcat(), this function is used to look up messages in a message catalog, presumably for natural language translation. gettext() is susceptible to environment variable driven buffer overflows.

APIs	Function Name	Comments
	dcgettext	

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1.   http://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/about_us/authors/35-BSI.html (Barnum, Sean)

	dcngettext	returns arbitrary length string
	dgettext	
	dngettext	returns arbitrary length string
	gettext	
	ngettext	returns arbitrary length string

Method of Attack	An attacker can manipulate the environment (LC_ALL or LC_MESSAGES environment variables) to provide a malicious set of messages that might overrun buffers. Static buffers need to be used with care.
Exception Criteria	

Solutions			
	Solution Applicability	**Solution Description**	**Solution Efficacy**
	Whenever using gettext()	All output from gettext() should be validated. If possible, validate LC_ALL and LC_MESSAGES prior to calling it. gettext() returns a const char* to the message; length should be checked before copying it to any buffer.	Effective.

Signature Details	char * gettext (const char * msgid);

| **Examples of Incorrect Code** | ```
char * translation =
gettext("Please try again");
char * error_msg [5];
strcpy(error_msg, translation);
``` |
|---|---|

| **Examples of Corrected Code** | ```
int buf_len = 10;
char * translation =
gettext("Please try again");
char * error_msg [buf_len];
strncpy(error_msg, translation,
buf_len);
``` |
|---|---|

Source References	• Rough Auditing Tool for Security (RATS)[2] • gettext() man page • GETTEXT [3](2001).

		•	Arce, Ivan. FOLLOUP: UNIX locale vulnerability[4] (2000).
Recommended Resource			
Discriminant Set	**Operating System**	•	Windows
	Languages	•	C
		•	C++

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1. mailto:copyright@cigital.com
